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Abstract
This paper builds upon the theoretical work of Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann and
offers a critical reconstruction of their views on religion (Christianity) and secularization in
the western world. It discusses the relation between the functional differentiation of modern
society, the individualization of inclusion imperatives and the changing expectations regarding
inclusion/exclusion in religious communication. From this perspective, it analyzes secular-
ization in terms of perceived problems of inclusion in religious communication, and in terms
of the reactions of Christian religions to these perceived problems. It thereby shows how the
theories of Parsons and Luhmann are useful for empirical and historical research, and how
they open up new perspectives for empirical and historical research.
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Introduction
Throughout Niklas Luhmann’s entire scholarly oeuvre, there has been a strong emphasis on the conditions
and consequences of social differentiation. Luhmann’s analyses focus, more particularly, on the basic
forms of social differentiation, notably segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation. Luhmann
has primarily discussed and analysed the birth of the modern world in terms of the transition to the latter
form of differentiation. He saw this form as a specific historical arrangement that starts to emerge in the
late Middle Ages and is recognized as disruptive only in the second half of the eighteenth century.
In an early programmatic text, Luhmann argued that this differentiation form begins as a differen-
tiation of roles. It already occurs in societies primarily characterized by stratification, but ‘it gains
momentum only if at least two different roles organize their complementary expectations around a
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specific function – for example, clerics and laymen, politicians and the public, teachers and pupils’
(Luhmann, 1977a: 35). This form thus not only depends on the specification of expert roles, but also
on the articulation of corresponding public roles. The public needs to be differentiated in role terms, as
well. Each system needs to enact its own public: the child (who is ‘discovered’ in the late-eighteenth
century) in the case of education, the electorate in the case of politics, public opinion for the mass
media, consumers organized by markets for economic production, fans and spectators in the case of
sport, medical ‘cases’ for the system of health care, and so on. Functional differentiation thus gains
momentum when these systems start to define their ‘clientele’ in universalistic, totalising terms. For
Luhmann, this differentiation form thus depends on the inclusion of large populations in differentiated
public roles.
If the society introduces compulsory school education for everyone, if every person regardless of his being
nobleman or commoner, being Christian, Jewish, or Moslem, being infant or adult, is subject to the same legal
status, if ‘the public’ is provided with a political function as electorate, if every individual is acknowledged as
choosing or not choosing a religious commitment; and if everybody can buy everything and pursue every
occupation, given the necessary resources, then the whole system shifts in the direction of functional differ-
entiation. (Luhmann, 1977a: 40; see also Luhmann, 1997: 618–634)
Not surprisingly, Luhmann also discussed secularization as a consequence of social differentiation.
Building upon classical sociological theory, he argued that the increasing difference between the pri-
mary subsystems of modern society had forced religion to ‘adapt’ (see, for example, Chaves, 1994;
Dobbelaere, 2002). In the modern era, religion has become a matter of special interest at the societal
level: one among many instead of the one that provides the foundation for the many. It ‘has gained
recognized autonomy at the cost of recognizing the autonomy of the other subsystems, i.e. seculariza-
tion’ (Luhmann, 1985a: 14). Interestingly, however, Luhmann also referred in this context to changes
in the social regulation of inclusion and exclusion. If social differentiation implies the differentiation
of the rules for inclusion and exclusion, then each system has to regulate – on its own – the participa-
tion of large populations. As with other systems, religion has to specify the criteria for participation in
its lay or public roles. While it might be said that persons have come to be conceived as incorporated
into religion as ‘believers’, as adherents of single ‘churches’ in the modern era, it also seems clear that
religion has difficulty tackling the issue of inclusion. In comparison with several other function sys-
tems, it has difficulty elaborating analogous forms of commitment. From this comparative point of
view, secularization may be analysed in terms of the specific inclusion problems of religion (see
Luhmann, 2012: 216–221). The purpose of this paper is to explore and discuss the relevance and impli-
cations of Luhmann’s reflections on inclusion/exclusion and religion/secularization.
For this purpose, it is – as so often – helpful to compare Luhmann’s approach with that of Talcott
Parsons (see also Tyrell, 1996; Vanderstraeten, 2002). In many ways, Luhmann has indeed worked
‘after’ Parsons (in both senses of the word: in the time after as well as inspired by). Hereafter I will
discuss both Parsons’ and Luhmann’s approaches of religion and secularization. I will thus not just
look at the historical and empirical material they present, but also at the ways they treat religion and
secularization in corresponding theoretical terms. Overall, the focus will be on Christianity – because
both Parsons and Luhmann for the most part limited their analyses to this world religion.
Neither Parsons nor Luhmann have hitherto had as large an impact on the field of sociology of
religion as one might have expected. Parsons (1902–1979) discussed religion particularly during the
last ten or fifteen years of his life. In the last book that he saw into print, however, he depicted his
contributions to the sociology of religion as ‘work-in-progress’ (Parsons, 1978: 167–172). These con-
tributions also did not receive much (if any) attention in the scholarly community. Since the ‘critical’
1960s and 1970s, most of his work has met with outright rejection. Until now, the ensuing general
ignorance about his theoretical framework has also stood in the way of any serious discussion of his
contributions about religion and religious change. Luhmann (1927–1998), too, had to leave his work
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unfinished. Next to a number of papers, he was the author of two books on religion: Funktion der Reli-
gion (Luhmann, 1977b) and A Systems Theory of Religion (Luhmann, 2012) – but it should be noted
that the first of these books is a collection of five essays, while the second one is a posthumously pub-
lished, unfinished manuscript. Both this fact and the link with Parsons probably also account for the
relative neglect of Luhmann’s work in the field of sociology of religion. In this paper, however, I will
not only try to reconstruct the thrust of both Parsons’ and Luhmann’s views on the relation between
religion (Christianity) and inclusion, but will also indicate how their approaches lead to new insights
into religion and secularization in modern society.
Inclusion ideals
In Parsons’ oeuvre, the notion of inclusion gained prominence at a relatively late stage. Parsons incor-
porated the notion in his theoretical framework in order to adjust and complement the classical Durkhei-
mian thesis, which says that increasing differentiation is related to, and dependent on, demographic
changes (Durkheim, 1930). He argued that statistical changes in the size and/or density of the population
(including urbanization) did not suffice to make the difference. He concerned himself instead with the
social mechanisms used to regulate participation in the relevant social systems – thereby directing atten-
tion towards the changing forms of membership and of ‘acceptance’ within society and its subsystems
(cf. Marshall, 1950). In the posthumously published monograph American Society, for example, Parsons
(2007: 74) listed a number of expansive inclusion mechanisms: the introduction of the poor laws, the
beginnings of formal education and mandatory schooling for all, the extension of the franchise, the
acquisition of formal citizenship by immigrants. For Parsons, inclusion referred to the assignment of
civil rights to increasing parts of the population – eventually to every single individual, irrespective
of seemingly natural qualities such as race, gender, kinship or ethnicity. Increasing inclusion meant that
increasing parts of the population were expected to ‘have developed legitimate capacities to ‘‘contrib-
ute’’ to the functioning of the system’ (Parsons, 1962: 22; see also Kivisto, 2004; Sciortino, 2010).
In this regard, Parsons’ analyses of inclusion mechanisms also shed light on the ways in which he
connected religious and societal changes. In his work, Parsons did not attempt to provide a detailed
historical account, but focused on some significant events, on some ‘essential constituents’ and ‘cru-
cial developments’ (Parsons, 1967: 391). In spite of the institutionalization of a hierarchical relation-
ship between the clergy and the laity, the conception of clerical office that developed in the Middle
Ages already signalled for Parsons an active concern with inclusion, with the expansion of an
upgraded membership in the Church of Christ. In an article entitled ‘Christianity and Modern Indus-
trial Society’, he not only stressed ‘the firm establishment of the principle that priesthood was an office
with powers and authority’ (Parsons, 1967: 398), but also underlined that ‘there has been extension of
the range of institutionalization of the values, above all through the influence on the laity through the
secular clergy’ (Parsons, 1967: 401). In Parsons’ reading, this upgraded form of membership implied
that Christianity could not remain primarily a specialized or monastic concern, as it had become dur-
ing the so-called Dark Ages. It signalled to the contrary that religion was to be carried out more or less
equally and fully by all members of the population. Embedded within the hierarchical society of medi-
eval and early-modern Europe, however, the relationship between the clergy and the laity had to
remain asymmetric and hierarchical. Parsons spoke of the ‘medieval synthesis’ of the Holy Roman
Empire as ‘a stage in a process of development’ (Parsons, 1967: 396).
As a sociologist of modernity, Parsons’ interest lay mostly in two later ‘stages’ of this process of
upgrading and inclusion of all parts of the population. The first of these was initiated by the Protestant
Reformation. The Protestant reformers no longer perceived the clergy as the manipulators of divine
grace, as the mediators between God and men. The sacraments became merely symbolic affirmations
of faith and commitment to the Christian message. As a consequence, the distinction between the
clergy and the laity lost much of its religious significance. Every individual was ‘granted’ the same,
immediate kind of contact with God. The abolition of the religious orders pointed in the same
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direction. It served to underline the view that a fully religious life could be lived in the ordinary status
of the lay citizen and not only as a monk or ordained priest. Although at first sight this interpretation of
the Reformation parallels closely that provided by Weber in Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist
des Kapitalismus, Parsons drew quite different conclusions: ‘This change has often been interpreted as
reflecting a relaxation of standards of religious rigor . . .There has, however, been another interpreta-
tion of the change. This is to the effect that the change was not primarily a downgrading (religiously
speaking) of the clergy, both regular and secular, but rather an upgrading of the laity’ (Parsons, 1978:
306).1 For Parsons, Protestantism thus made a religiously autonomous entity of the individual, respon-
sible for their own religious concerns. Its idea of ‘universal priesthood’ expressed the new social
expectations regarding the realization of inclusion. The Reformation initiated an upgrading of the
roles, which are open to each and every individual within (Protestant) Christianity.
After the Peace of Westphalia, which brought in 1648 an end to the wars of religion in Europe, both
Protestant and Catholic rulers could assume that their ‘subjects’ – that is, the members of the population
subject to their authority – would adhere to their religion. The famous Latin formula cuius regio, eius
religio [whose realm, his religion] expressed the right of rulers to determine which religion would hold
sway within their political realm. In Parsons’ reading, the formula not only coordinated state and reli-
gious identity; it also maintained a distinction between state and religion. Stated somewhat differently:
while the order of the formula points in the direction of what we would today call the regulation of reli-
gion by the state, the formula does not say a great deal about how the ruler’s religion would be the reli-
gion of the realm. The model that emerged after the Peace of Westphalia promulgated the idea of a state
religion, but thereby brought with it the consequential notions of what we have learned to call ‘religious
minorities’ and the then already prevalent idea of the possibility of ‘tolerance’ of those minorities
(Beyer, 2012: 115). In Parsons’ reading, the coexistence of different religious affiliations within one
political territory paved the way for the next stage in the inclusion process. The idea of religious toler-
ance not only made it possible to think of membership in religious organizations as a matter of private
choice; it also made it necessary to develop more encompassing notions of inclusion. Parsons spoke of
‘the conception of the legitimacy of a pluralistic religious constitution internal to the principality, a first
step taken in Holland and England after the Reformation’ (Parsons, 1978: 245). But he immediately
added: ‘Only in our own time, however, . . . the individual is held to have a right to the religious adher-
ence, including beliefs, of his own choice and . . . that right includes recognition of the religious legiti-
macy of the adherents of other faiths’ (Parsons, 1978: 245–246).
For Parsons, this stage came more or less to completion in his own time and nation. From the outset,
the (North) American religion had been forged by the flight from religious oppression and Puritanism.
It also made the transition towards ‘the denominational phase’. The American system of ‘denomina-
tional pluralism’, Parsons argued, ‘may be regarded as a further extension of the same basic line of
institutionalization of Christian ethics, which was produced both by the medieval synthesis and by the
Reformation’ (Parsons, 1967: 412). Parsons saw both the constitutional separation between church and
state (disestablishment) and the constitutional protection of religious freedom as defining character-
istics of the American religious system, which allowed this system to develop along voluntary and
pluralistic, denominational lines (see also Parsons, 1978: 202). Parsons also clearly regarded freedom
of choice and voluntarism in religion as an advance in religion. The denominational phase was, in his
view, ‘a major further step in the emancipation of the individual from tutelary control by organized
religious collectivities’ (Parsons, 1967: 414, his emphasis). He specified his viewpoint as follows:
The individual is responsible not only for managing his own relation to God through faith within the ascribed
framework of an established church, which is the Reformation position, but for choosing that framework
itself, for deciding as a mature individual what to believe, and with whom to associate himself in the orga-
nizational expression and reinforcement of this commitments. This is essentially the removal of the last ves-
tige of coercive control over the individual in the religious sphere; he is endowed with full responsible
autonomy. (Parsons, 1967: 414, his emphases)
176 Acta Sociologica 58(2)
 by guest on April 10, 2015asj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
In Parsons’ view, the voluntary–associational form of modern American religion thus ‘empowered’
the individual in ways which had not been possible in earlier developmental stages.
The processes of upgrading and inclusion during ‘the denominational phase’ also necessitated basic
socio-cultural changes. It made it necessary to generalize community ideals. Especially in the second
half of the twentieth century, Parsons argued, America’s religion was about to incorporate much
broader and diverse influences. In a lecture on ‘Religion in a Modern Pluralistic Society’, for example,
he maintained: ‘This [religious] base, from a pluralistic one in Protestant terms, has become an ecu-
menical one in Judeo-Christian terms and may well broaden still further’ (Parsons, 1966: 135). In an
article on ‘Christianity’, originally written for the 1968 edition of the International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences, he added: ‘The crucial phenomenon is the inclusion of the non-Protestant groups
in a national community which, though of course secular in government, still retains its religious char-
acter as a holy community in the transformed sense of a ‘‘nation under God’’’ (Parsons, 1978: 203; see
also Parsons and Platt, 1973: 42). Influenced by the social and ecumenical movements of the 1960s
and 1970s (including the election of the Roman Catholic John F Kennedy to the office of President
of the United States), as well as by the work of his former student Robert Bellah, Parsons stressed the
genesis of a civil or secular religion.2 He argued that the genesis of a broad, generalized civil religion
was capable of supporting and sustaining American society by overriding its religious, ethnic and
social diversity. (Similar developments, he assumed, were about to take place in Europe and elsewhere
in the western world, too. He particularly welcomed the ecumenical interests expressed by the Roman
Catholic Church and pope Paul VI after Vatican II.) In this view, the secularization of Christian
religious values had to be understood as an evolution towards more inclusive forms of religion.
Parsons did not question a key idea of the ‘mainstream’ secularization literature of his time –
namely, that the choice for specific religious commitments was becoming ‘privatized’ and that tradi-
tional religious institutions were made ‘invisible’ at the societal level (e.g., Berger, 1967; Luckmann,
1967). From Parsons’ perspective, religious pluralism had to go hand in hand with the reduction of the
societal influence of specific religious commitments. ‘It is clear that the more extensive the range of
denominational inclusion within the American system the more the denominationally specific compo-
nents of religious belief, practice and organization must be ‘‘privatized’’’ (Parsons, 1966: 134; see also
Parsons, 1967: 385–421, 1978: 307–312). However, in his perspective, increasing diversity and
increasing pluralism also had to be compensated for at the value-oriented level. The individualization
of inclusion regulations called for broader, more encompassing value patterns. In order to remain the
property of the whole, increasingly diverse and pluralistic societal system, religious frameworks had
to become increasingly generalized (Lechner, 1998; Turner, 2011: 228–235; Vanderstraeten, 2014a;
Warner, 1993: 1046–1048). Parsons welcomed the secularization and generalization of religious val-
ues in the American ‘melting pot’, because, idiosyncratically, he identified secularization with a pro-
cess of opening up the societal community to a larger and increasingly diverse population.
At this point it is not difficult to see how Parsons’ functionalist account of religion shaped his read-
ing of the available historical and empirical analyses. Parsons clearly exhibited a strong tendency to
conflate systemic requirements with empirical history (see also Sciortino, 2010: 248). In Parsons’
view, increasing diversity and plurality had to be compensated for by enhanced control or coordination
at the value level. He expected near-consensus among the population members at the level of the ulti-
mate values or last resources. He clearly did not doubt the necessity of broadly shared habits of the
heart: ‘they must share in what in some sense is a common religion’ (Parsons, 1978: 250). In his view,
the generalization of religious values had to complement the growing diversity of individual religious
options. It had to affirm and sacralize the structures that afforded inclusion ideals protection within
modern (American) society. In this sense, Parsons’ view on religion also stayed close to the original,
etymological meaning of the word ‘religion’ (religio: bond). The influence of Durkheim’s classic def-
inition is evident, too: whatever else it is, a society is a moral/religious community. In reaction to
increasing differentiation and inclusion, the generalization of religious values had to arrange for
‘organic solidarity’, as Durkheim would have said.
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The limitations of this approach also become visible when the circular structure of Parsons’ anal-
yses is taken into account. Parsons not only argued that religion (Christianity) legitimated the institu-
tionalization of the ideal of full inclusion in modern (American) society. Inversely, he also assumed
that increasing inclusion could not but enhance the relevance of religion in modern society. The insti-
tutionalization of membership ideals was bound to strengthen the community’s ultimate values,
because it would imply that larger parts of the population would be motivated by the same values, by the
same civil religion. Parsons believed that in this generalized form religion was able to direct and control the
choices made by ‘socialized’ individuals in secular spheres. It was able to set ethical standards for life in
this world. From this point of view, Parsons defined secularization as a transformation process ‘which has
sanctified, by inclusion, and moral upgrading component after component of what was originally con-
ceived to be the world by contrast with the spiritual order’ (Parsons, 1978: 253). In his own uncommon
and idiosyncratic way, he also spoke of ‘each additional step in secularization, in the sense of the institu-
tionalization of Christian patterns in the secular world’ (Parsons, 1978: 261).
The emphasis on increasing value generalization thus matched with that on increasing inclusion.
In this sense, Parsons’ view on the societal community and its value commitments made it nearly
impossible to question or interrogate the ‘master trend’ of increasing inclusion. His notion of inclu-
sion did not have an antonym. Although there are some references to forms and modes of exclusion in
his later work, especially in his discussion of the social condition of the ‘Negro American’ (see, for
example, Parsons, 1965: 742–744; 1978: 208), structural problems of inclusion or membership were
marginalized in this theoretical framework. On the basis of our reconstruction of Parsons’ theoretical
framework, however, it might already be seen how and why Luhmann proposed to take inclusion
problems as the point of departure for his post-Parsonsian analyses of religion and secularization
in modern society.
Inclusion problems
In contrast with Parsons, Luhmann put more emphasis on the functional differentiation of modern
society. Not unimportantly, he always preferred to use the untranslatable term Ausdifferenzierung.
In his view, the function systems differentiate ‘out’ within society. They ‘carve’ out their own terri-
tories; they generate their own dynamics and produce their own eigenvalues; they acquire a specific
(namely, ‘autopoietic’) form of autonomy. In Luhmann’s view, moreover, the transition to the form of
functional differentiation takes place in a somewhat uncoordinated, conflictual and chaotic manner.
While different systems may be confronted with similar expectations at the societal level, they also
aim to define their own functionalities.
As with the completion of a puzzle, the pieces that have already been differentiated have a suggestive influ-
ence on what can possibly and must necessarily be connected to them. But, unlike with a puzzle, it is not
certain from the outset that a complete picture will be produced or that it will be understandable as a whole.
(Luhmann and Schorr, 2000: 30)
Against this background, Luhmann also proposed to redefine the notion of inclusion. For Parsons,
as we have seen, inclusion meant full membership for every individual in the societal community. For
Luhmann, the form of functional differentiation is dependent on the differentiation and functional spe-
cification of the rules for inclusion and exclusion.3 For the different function systems, the institutio-
nalization of inclusion imperatives may serve to ensure the participation and active collaboration of
sufficiently large populations. It may allow them to develop their own eigenvalues. But the ensuing
heterogeneity of inclusions and exclusions in modern society may also lead to specific challenges
and problems – both at the individual and at the societal level (see, for example, Luhmann, 1997:
707–776).4
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Luhmann thus placed emphasis on the mutually constitutive relationship between inclusion and func-
tional differentiation. In order to grasp some of the corresponding challenges, it should be taken into
account that inclusion ideals do not – and cannot – simply realize themselves in modern society. Espe-
cially since the end of the eighteenth century, for example, all kinds of ‘search engines’ have been put to
use in order to provide detailed population data: registers of births and deaths, general population cen-
suses, administrative statistics of all kinds. In the nineteenth and early-twentieth century, the legislators
intervened in many ways – for example, by imposing mandatory schooling for all children (education) or
enabling universal franchise (politics). In the welfare state, which developed after the Second World War,
widening access to social services has also been the object of numerous state interventions. Inclusion in
religion, however, has never been an issue of comparable concern. In Europe, not even the so-called State
Churches received similar forms of support (see Luhmann, 1977b: 232–242; see also Vanderstraeten,
1999). As a consequence, the ‘modern’ religious collectivities had and have to develop their own strate-
gies to recruit their public, to motivate the laity to worship. They also have to cope with the risk that they
might fail to attract and include large numbers of people; they have to be able to deal with the fact that
people might turn themselves away from (this form of) religion.
Luhmann formulated this point of view also somewhat differently. He did not question that the
comparatively early differentiation and specification of religious eigenvalues had been able to trigger
a broad range of other processes of functional differentiation within society (see Luhmann, 1989:
259–357). However, he argued that religion has had to restructure and reconceive itself as a conse-
quence of the transition to the form of functional differentiation. When functional differentiation
wins primacy over other forms of differentiation, Luhmann argued, religion has to ‘adapt to this order
and has to become a functional subsystem . . .At least it will be treated as such whether it finds this
situation comfortable or not and whether or not it prefers to remain maladaptive to some extent’
(Luhmann, 1985b: 34–35). In line with what has been argued above, we might also say that the
differentiation of inclusion imperatives put the religious collectivities to work. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries these collectivities were increasingly perceived and treated in ‘modern’ ways –
even if they themselves did not (want to) change. They had to ‘adapt’; they had to specify their own
premises, their own rules for inclusion and exclusion. Although, for example, the Christian Churches
retained existing ceremonies of enrolment and admittance, such as baptism, they were forced to
develop more active ways to evangelize, to include large populations.
Seen in this light, it is clear that the specification of these inclusion rules is both socially and
historically contingent. However, the way in which religion is conceived at particular times and
in particular places also has consequences. Although Luhmann did not provide detailed historical
analyses of this (mal-)adaptation process and its consequences, some examples may illustrate how
the restructuring of religion took place.
First, attention can be directed to the specification of the membership criteria in the system of reli-
gion itself. ‘It can be argued, on the basis of available historical evidence, that, especially in the after-
math of the Protestant Reformation in Europe, religion became defined as ‘Church(es)’ – with a focus
on exclusive membership or adherence (whether voluntary or ascribed), as well as on beliefs and
practices (see, for example, Beyer, 2012: 117).’ Just as, for instance, modern nations were ‘imagined’
as political communities to which citizens (no longer ‘subjects’) fundamentally belonged, the
Churches tried to incorporate their members as believers in encompassing and continuous ways. In
this sense, many attempts were made to ‘church’ different national populations in the modern era.
Indeed, popularization became an important imperative for the Churches; the members had to be
immersed in the Church to which they belonged (see, for example, Chaves, 2004; Finke and Stark,
2005; McDannell, 1998; Sperber, 1984).5 In this sense, too, participation in the system of religion has
thus gradually come to be understood and measured in terms of attendance, membership, belonging,
or commitment to the tenets and practices of specific religious organizations.
Also of significance is the concomitant rise of ‘worldly’ activities in the Christian Churches. Of
course, these churches could build on a long tradition of providing charity for the poor and indigents;
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but in the nineteenth century they clearly expanded their range of activities. Religiously committed
organizations were established almost everywhere: in education, health care, politics, the mass
media, the economy, etc. Often the aim was to ensure that fellow believers could live their entire
life in their own circle: from the cradle to the grave. Building upon Luhmann’s approach, this type
of worldly activism may also be perceived as a way to control the inclusion of large populations in
the system of religion. By investing ‘in the world’, larger parts of the population could be committed
to the religious projects (Luhmann, 2012: 216–221). For the Christian Churches, however, this
worldly activism also had unintended consequences. If religious organizations are active in the
world, they also need to adapt to the world in order to make a difference. They have to contribute
to other functionalities. They have to adhere to other eigenvalues, such as medical, educational, polit-
ical or entertainment values. There is now a significant body of historical research that deals with the
competing value commitments in this type of worldly activism.6 With Luhmann, the motives behind
this worldly activism of the Christian Churches may be related to the primacy of functional differ-
entiation. Because non-participation in religious communication often has but few consequences for
individuals in modern society, it becomes particularly difficult to tackle the inclusion problems
within religion itself.
Seen against this background, some characteristic religious developments in the modern era may be
put into perspective. Until the early-modern era, being excluded from religion (that is, excommunica-
tion) often meant exclusion or banishment from the society at large. In the functionally differentiated
society, however, individuals can forego participating in religion without being excluded from other
social systems. It may be added that the costs of exclusion from a range of other social systems (school
education, the labour market, legal protection, and so on) currently often outweigh those of exclusion
from organized forms of religion. It should therefore not come as a surprise that the ‘modern’ Christian
Churches have searched for alternative, compensatory strategies and that they have tried to establish
strong links with other, more successful systems. But it should also be noted that the ensuing reloca-
tion of the centre of gravity of Christianity – from the internal, religious domain to worldly activism –
has been a very important consequence of secularization. Against this background, it may be argued
further that these reactions to the perceived inclusion problems account for the relatively abrupt tran-
sition from ascetic Protestantism to a eudemonic and theologically undemanding civil religion (and
not vice versa – as Parsons suggested).
In the secularization chapter of his posthumously published, unfinished monograph A Systems The-
ory of Religion, Luhmann developed his argument mostly in another direction. Pointing to the exis-
tence of less-organized forms of ‘spirituality’ and religion, he questioned the historically contingent
identification of participation in religion with church membership and belonging. The ‘church form’
may have acquired a dominant position within the modern system of religion – notwithstanding the
historical variety of religious movements and developments that were difficult to incorporate in this
form. However, in more recent years, the system of religion also seems to transform away from this
form. For Luhmann, recent developments make clear that religion can become something other than
churched religion – that it can transform into new forms. The less-organized and often also less-
demanding forms of spirituality might be dealt with as one of the ways in which contemporary religion
is adapting to the so-called post-secular condition (see also Taylor, 2007).
In addition, Luhmann also suggested in the secularization chapter of his Systems Theory of Reli-
gion that some of the aforementioned activistic reactions to the perceived problem of secularization
have come to constitute part of the problem itself. In this context, he focused on the potential
advantages of differentiation. He put particular emphasis on the strong isolation of the system of
religion in our contemporary society. In his words: the fact ‘that religion is independent of the
inclusions/exclusions originating in other systems . . . raises important questions for religion in mod-
ern society. The issue can hardly be recognized anymore as one of ‘‘secularization’’’ (Luhmann,
2012: 200). Following Luhmann, religious collectivities might nowadays be well advised to make
use of their relatively isolated position, of the lack of interdependencies with other function systems
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at the level of the rules for inclusion and exclusion. Religion is able to ignore near exclusion from
other function systems, such as not having money, an education, an identity card or a chance of
being taken seriously by the police or a judge. In some of the final sentences of this chapter, Luh-
mann wrote:
Although the inadequate integration of religion – both in inclusionary and exclusionary realms – results from
the differentiation of other function systems, it does not somehow entail a disadvantage or even a loss of func-
tion for religion. Rather, the issue is whether and how religion can take advantage of the ensuing opportuni-
ties. (Luhmann, 2012: 220)
In this sense, religion may make use of the differentiation of the entire population into loosely
coupled public roles. For Luhmann, secularization may thus also provide opportunities for religion.
He believed that religion could still fulfil a specific social function – albeit as a counterculture.
Conclusion
Both Parsons and Luhmann analysed religion in its social and cultural environments. Both Parsons
and Luhmann also worked within the same sociological tradition. ‘Naturally,’ Luhmann remarked
shortly after Parsons’ death, ‘we are at liberty to elaborate Parsons’ theory further and to look for
applications. But at the present time it seems at least equally important to let in a bit of fresh air’
(Luhmann, 1982: 48). In retrospect, it is not difficult to see that Luhmann did more than let in a bit
of fresh air. The remark is an understatement of his own contributions to this line of sociological the-
orizing. However, as I have tried to show, comparing Parsons’ and Luhmann’s approaches is helpful
in order to elaborate further this theoretical tradition and to look for applications in the field of sociol-
ogy of religion.
Parsons did not question the compatibility of religion (Christianity) with modern society. He
focused instead on the survival and transformation of religion in his own nation – long before debates
in sociology in general and the sociology of religion in particular would start to direct attention to
what has been called ‘American exceptionalism’. He linked the ‘re-invention’ of religion in the ‘new
nation’ to distinctive features of its religious and political organization. The institutionalization of
inclusion ideals prompted the new nation-state to seek identity and solidarity through a more encom-
passing, generalized form of civil religion. The principle of voluntarism in religion constituted an
advance in religion and in society – not only because it emancipated the individual from ascribed ties
and ascribed belief systems, but also because it created the conditions for the rise of new, sacralized
ideals of the ‘good society’ and new forms of adhering or belonging to the American nation-state.
Furthermore, it should be added that Parsons believed that similar social and religious developments
were taking place in other parts of the western world. He clearly did not treat the American society of
his time as an exception or aberration in need of an extra explanation. He viewed it instead as having
achieved the highest evolutionary stage, distinctive by virtue of its advances.
Luhmann (1982) not only remarked that Parsons’ own theory should have prevented him from
viewing modern society in its American variant as superior to others; he also avoided discussing mod-
ern religion as just the continuation of what went before, as the next stage in a Parsonsian ‘process of
development’. Instead the theory he developed placed emphasis on the historical and social contin-
gency of ‘modern religion’. This theory also allowed him to point to possible alternatives – both
conceptually and institutionally.
In contrast to Parsons, Luhmann put much emphasis on the differentiation of the rules for inclusion
and exclusion. In Luhmann’s view, religion had been forced to reconceive itself as a consequence of
the transition to functional differentiation. In several ways, this transition encouraged the mutual mod-
eling of different function systems. The rules for inclusion and exclusion in religion were moulded
after those of other systems. Just as the modern nation-states tried to encompass the social lives of the
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people contained in them, and thus aimed at exclusive membership of people within them, so did west-
ern religions develop as churches that incorporated their members as believers and that expected those
members to be involved in an encompassing and continuous way (see Beyer, 2012; Lechner, 1997;
Vanderstraeten, 2014b). But the specification of religion in terms of churched religion also led to a
range of problems for this system. To tackle its inclusion problems, the churches have also tried to
forge alliances with organizations in other systems (notably with organizations specializing in educa-
tion, health care and politics). I have briefly discussed above some of the unintended consequences of
this organized worldly activism. As Luhmann remarked, it is in more recent years that religion seems
to transform away from the ‘church form’ and the accompanying membership ideals and reconceive
itself in less-organized, post-secular ways.
We may conclude that the way we understand religion and religions today still owes a great deal to
the way religion reconceived itself in response to the institutionalization of inclusion imperatives.
Even the standard measures of religious participation or secularization, which are applied in most
available historical and sociological research, are a result of the religious reactions to the institutiona-
lization of these imperatives. In other words, our standard approaches of secularization are the out-
come of a path-dependent process. Both Parsons and Luhmann have highlighted alternative ways
of approaching secularization. In Luhmann’s work in particular, one finds the instruments to recognize
and observe alternative forms of religion – whether in Europe or in the United States. In this sense,
Luhmann’s analyses of religion and secularization aim at sociological enlightenment: they illuminate
the contingency of taken-for-granted structures and point to other options.
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Notes
1. Weber perceived the Protestant Revolution, especially in its Calvinist–Puritan version, as the start of
a general reorientation of Christianity: from an other-worldly to a this-worldly direction. Religious
callings were redirected to the secular, this-worldly sphere. Weber’s expressive image of the breaking
of the monastery walls conveys this idea: the symbolic walls separating the religious and the secular
spheres break down (Casanova, 1994: 11–39). Similarly, the young Peter Berger famously argued
that Christianity had contributed to its own demise. ‘Historically speaking, Christianity has been its
own gravedigger’ (Berger, 1967: 129).
2. Bellah (1970) drew attention, among other things, to the references to God in presidential inaugurals
and the uses of popular expressions that invoke God (‘one nation under God,’ ‘may God bless Amer-
ica,’ ‘in God we trust,’ etc.). Most of these phrases do not specify whose God is meant. But do they
also include everyone in the societal community? Do such expressions really ‘empower’ the entire
population? Bellah himself ceased using the term in the late 1980s, frustrated by its ‘unnecessary rei-
fication’ (Bellah, 1989; see also Gardella, 2014).
3. This line of argument relies on other work from that time. Following SF Nadel, for example, ‘the
anonymous public is narrowed down and differentiated in role terms . . . [The public will] assume
a particular role or quasi-role, more or less enduring or sharply defined; in this sense the public of
a craftsman become his ‘‘customers’’ or ‘‘patrons,’’ the public of a doctor his ‘‘patients,’’ and that
of poets and priests, an ‘‘audience’’ or ‘‘congregation’’’ (Nadel, 1957: 76). Related, too, is the
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distinction between the crowd and the public, introduced by RE Park (1972: 50–62). For a more
detailed discussion, see Stichweh (2005).
4. Following Luhmann (1989: 149–258), persons no longer have a relatively fixed location or identity
within modern society – for example, one determined by the household or clan to which they belong.
What someone ‘is’, is now defined according to what they possess or earn, the rights they have
acquired, their schooling, their reputation in politics, science, art, the mass media, and so on. It is
defined by the combination of various inclusions and exclusions. At the level of the individual, indi-
vidualization is the most obvious outcome of this differentiation and decentralization of inclusions
and exclusions.
5. Many historical examples may be cited. Protestants, for example, started to call for awakening, revival,
reveil, renouveau, etc. Both Protestant and Catholic missionary organizations were established in var-
ious parts of the world. Frequent participation in celebrations of the Mass also became the object of an
active ‘identity politics’. In the Catholic Church there was a clear rise of devotional practices, worships,
processions and pilgrimages (such as the veneration of the Virgin Mary). In more general theoretical
terms, it might be argued that religion tried to elaborate and impose its criteria or eigenvalues.
6. See, for example, the analyses of the evolution of active congregations in the Catholic Church – that
is, religious communities of men or women who devote themselves to apostolic work ‘in the world’.
These congregations have aptly been called the ‘sacred militia’ of the Catholic Church. However,
their work in the world also started to mould their religious way of life. The life lived by brothers
and sisters behind high brick walls, in the splendid isolation of their cloisters, became clearly mod-
elled by their worldly tasks. Just as the many duties turned the religious calling of a secular priest into
a ‘one-man bureaucracy’, the members of religious congregations were/are absorbed by their work in
the world (see also Vanderstraeten, 2014b).
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